
Rick Steves' Greece: Athens & the Peloponnese amazon.com

Bust: Greece, the Euro and the Sovereign Debt Crisis - By Matthew Lynn amazon.com

Greece's 'Odious' Debt: The Looting of the Hellenic Republic by the Euro, the Political Elite and the Investment Community - By Jason Manolopoulos amazon.com

Understanding the Crisis in Greece: From Boom to Bust - By Theodore Pelagidis amazon.com

The Imminent Crisis: Greek Debt and the Collapse of the European Monetary Union amazon.com

Eyewitness Greece - Athens and the Mainland - 352 Pages

Financial markets and economic growth in Greece, 1986-1999 [An article from: Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions & Money]
A blog entry at the Financial Times Alphaville with report by Neil Hume about a talk with Willem Buiter, Professor of European Political Economy, London School of Economics and Political Science:
"Willem Buiter has been looking at the €860bn war chest the EU and the IMF have amassed to tackle the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone and the unresolved question of what the cash might actually be used for. His big fear is the money, in particular the European Financial Stabilisation Fund, ends up being used as a bank recapitalisation funds, in much the same way the Trouble Asset Relief Programme (TARP) was ultimately used to inject capital in the US banking system, not buy illiquid asset."
...Should the risk of an early restructuring-with-NPV-haircut of the Greek sovereign debt materialise, and should one or more of the other Peripherals end up requiring access to the funds provided by the €440bn EFSF and/or to other parts of the €750bn pot of money put together for EA member states other than Greece, a sharp mark-down (and, in the case of a restructuring, a partial write-off) on the value at which Euro Area banks carry these sovereign debt instruments in their balance sheets looks bound to result. This could weaken the capital positions of many Euro Area banks materially.
...Euro Area banks therefore need additional capital – a lot of it. This may not be apparent from their ratios of regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets but, in our view, both the numerator and the denominator of this ratio are deeply unreliable. Many EA banks include in their definition of tier-one capital things other than tangible common equity – the only unconditional loss absorber, in our view."
"Deeply unreliable" seems to indicate that "triple A rated" debt may in fact be something far worse in reality.
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